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Abstract—We analyze the secrecy outage probability in the
downlink for wireless networks with spatially (Poisson) dis-
tributed eavesdroppers (EDs) under the assumption that the
base station employs transmit antenna selection (TAS) to enhance
secrecy performance. We compare the cases where the receiving
user equipment (UE) operates in half-duplex (HD) mode and
full-duplex (FD) mode. In the latter case, the UE simultaneously
receives the intended downlink message and transmits a jamming
signal to strengthen secrecy. We investigate two models of
(semi)passive eavesdropping: (1) EDs act independently and (2)
EDs collude to intercept the transmitted message. For both
of these models, we obtain expressions for the secrecy outage
probability in the downlink for HD and FD UE operation. The
expressions for HD systems have very accurate approximate or
exact forms in terms of elementary and/or special functions for
all path loss exponents. Those related to the FD systems have
exact integral forms for general path loss exponents, while exact
closed forms are given for specific exponents. A closed-form
approximation is also derived for the FD case with colluding
EDs. The resulting analysis shows that the reduction in the
secrecy outage probability is logarithmic in the number of
antennas used for TAS and identifies conditions under which
HD operation should be used instead of FD jamming at the UE.
These performance trends and exact relations between system
parameters can be used to develop adaptive power allocation
and duplex operation methods in practice. Examples of such
techniques are alluded to herein.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, stochastic geometry,
secrecy outage probability, antenna selection, full-duplex
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security, based on Shannon theory using
channel coding to achieve secure transmission, has been fre-
quently considered in academia since Wyner’s seminal work
[1]. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications,
both the intended receiver and eavesdroppers (EDs) may
receive data from the source. But if the capacity of the
intended data transmission channel is higher than that of
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the eavesdropping channel, the data can be transmitted at
a rate close to the intended channel capacity so that only
the intended receiver can successfully decode the data. This
is the principle of physical layer security, where the level
of security is quantified by the secrecy capacity, i.e., the
difference in channel capacities corresponding to the intended
data transmission and EDs.
Recently, many works have considered information theoretic
security (ITS) over wireless channels, including coopera-
tive relay and jammer networks [2], [3], buffer-added relay
networks [4], multiple-input multiple-output communications
(MIMO) [5], [6], full-duplex networks [7], cognitive radio
networks [8], and distributed beamforming methods [9]. How-
ever, all of these works not only assumed a small number of
nodes, but also assumed the locations of EDs are known. It
is impossible to obtain the location of EDs in practice. For
this reason, in 2008, Haenggi provided a powerful method to
model the random location distribution of nodes in wireless
networks [10], [11].
The impact of random ED locations on secrecy performance
has been investigated [12]–[16]. The location distribution of
EDs can be modeled as a Poisson point process (PPP) or a
binomial point process (BPP). In [12], the locations of multiple
legitimate pairs and EDs were represented as independent two-
dimensional PPPs, and the average secrecy throughput in such
a wireless network was studied. The MIMO transmission with
beamforming was considered later in [13], [14] to enhance
secrecy performance.
Cooperation is of paramount importance to enhance the
capacity and reduce the outage of communication systems
subjected to fading and unknown topologies [17]. As a result,
cooperation schemes have been widely applied to enhance
communication between legitimate users in a physical layer
secrecy context [2], [3]. However, relatively little attention
has been given to the impact of colluding or cooperative
EDs in random spatial networks. Notably, [18] investigated
achievable secrecy rates by using the so-called intrinsically
secure graph formalism, taking into account the effects of ED
collusion. Additionally, based on a beamforming technique,
the MIMO secrecy connectivity between devices operating
in the presence of Rayleigh fading and colluding EDs was
analysed in [19]. However, in that work, the complexity of
the system is high due to the use of multiple antennas with
beamforming, which may render the system unsuitable for
some practical applications.
2TABLE I
NOTATION AND SYMBOLS USED IN THE PAPER
Symbol Definition/Explanation
R
2 two-dimensional space
ρE density for Φ
α path loss exponent
ǫ target secrecy rate
E[·] expectation operation
max
k∈{1...K}
(xk) maximum function with a set
[x]+ max(0, x)
P(·) probability operator
Gm,ns,t
(
z
∣∣∣∣ u1, . . . , usv1, . . . , vt
)
Meijer G function
CkK binomial coefficient
Z
+ positive real numbers
Γ(x) standard gamma function
Γ(x, y) upper incomplete gamma function
K1(x) first order modified Bessel functions
O (x) big O notation
F (a, b; c; z) Gaussian hypergeometric function
E1(x) exponential integral function
R.V. random variable
Fig. 1. The wireless network model with randomly located EDs and fixed
BS and UE.
In this paper, we analyze the secrecy outage probability in
the downlink for wireless networks with randomly (Poisson)
distributed EDs. In order to keep the complexity relatively
low at the base station (BS), we consider transmit antenna
selection (TAS) rather than beamforming. Furthermore, we
compare the cases where the receiving user equipment (UE)
operates in half-duplex (HD) mode and full-duplex (FD) mode.
In the latter case, the UE simultaneously receives the intended
downlink message and transmits a jamming signal to disrupt
eavesdropping devices [7]. We also treat the case when EDs act
independently as well as the scenario when they collude. The
analytical framework that we present in this paper allows us to
make a fair comparison of these four system models (HD/FD
and independent/colluding EDs) and thus to draw conclusions
about the relative merits and drawbacks of using the secrecy
enhancement techniques of TAS and FD jamming under given
system parameterizations. The contributions of the paper are
summarized as follows.
• We propose TAS at the BS and FD jamming at the
receiver to enhance secrecy performance in the presence
of randomly located EDs.
• We obtain expressions for the secrecy outage probability
in the downlink for HD and FD receivers operating in the
presence of independent and colluding EDs. The expres-
sions for HD systems have very accurate approximate
or exact forms in terms of elementary and/or special
functions for all path loss exponents. Those related to the
FD systems have exact integral forms; exact closed forms
are given for certain path loss exponents and closed-form
approximations are also derived.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the system model and problem formulation.
Sections III and IV given an analysis of the secrecy outage
probability for the cases where EDs act independently and
when they collude, respectively. Section V gives numerical
simulations in order to verify the analysis. Finally, section VI
concludes the paper. The notation and symbols used in the
paper are listed in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECRECY OUTAGE DEFINITION
A. System Model
We consider a secure transmission from the BS to one
legitimate UE1. The BS is equipped with K antennas, which it
uses to perform TAS in order to maximize the instantaneous
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the UE. The UE is equipped
with a hyper-duplex antenna, which can easily switch between
HD and FD modes. Without loss of generality, we locate the
BS at the origin in R2 and locate the UE at a fixed point a
distance dBU along the positive x-axis (see Fig. 1).
We assume EDs are randomly dispersed in a region in the
neighbourhood of the BS and the UE. To this end, we model
the EDs as a PPP Φ, which has intensity ρE in the closed disk
of radius R, which we denote by V , centred at the origin and
zero intensity in R2 \ V (Fig. 1). Each ED is equipped with
a single antenna, but we consider both the scenarios in which
EDs attempt to intercept the downlink signal independently as
well as the case when EDs collude to decode the transmitted
message.
All channels are assumed to undergo path loss and indepen-
dent Rayleigh fading effects. Hence, the coefficient modeling
the channel between nodes i and j can be decomposed as
gij = hijd
−α/2
ij , where α and dij denote the path loss
exponent and the distance between the two nodes, respec-
tively2. The fading coefficient hij is modeled as a complex
Gaussian random variable with unit variance (i.e., Rayleigh
fading is assumed). Therefore, the corresponding channel
gains |gij |2 are independently exponentially distributed with
mean value λij , and the average channel power is given by
λij = E[|gij |2] = d−αij , where E[·] denotes the expectation
operation. We assume that the channels are quasi-static, so
that the channel coefficients remain unchanged during several
packet transmissions but independently vary from coherence
time interval to another.
1If there are several users in the target cell, only one user is targeted
through user scheduling (e.g. random user selection).
2In what follows, we set the subscripts i and j to be elements in the
set {B,U, E} in order to denote transmissions from the BS, UE and EDs,
respectively. For example, gUE1 denotes the channel coefficient between the
UE and the first ED in Φ.
3B. Secrecy Performance
We define downlink secrecy performance using classical
wireless wiretap theory. We assume the channel state informa-
tion (CSI) between the BS and the UE is known by the BS3.
Therefore, by employing the TAS principle, the BS is able
to send a zero-mean symbol xs with E[|xs|2] = 1 to the UE
by selecting the kth antenna (corresponding to the maximum
instantaneous downlink SNR) in a given time slot.
In general, the received signal at the UE can be written as
yBkU =
√
PBgBkUxs +̟
√
PUgUUxj + nU (1)
where PB is the average transmit power at the BS and nU
denotes zero-mean complex Gaussian noise with variance
σ2n. The coefficient gUU corresponds to the residual self-
interference channel for the case where FD jamming is em-
ployed and xj denotes the zero-mean jamming signal which
has power E[|xj |2] = 1. The average transmit power of the
FD UE is PU . Eq. (1) can be applied to model systems with
both HD and FD UEs by adjusting the parameter ̟. In the
HD case, ̟ = 0, whereas in the FD case, ̟ = 1.
At the same time that the UE receives the message from
the BS, the EDs in the set Φ receive a copy of the transmitted
signal. The received signal at ED Ee can be written as
yBkEe =
√
PBgBkEexs +̟
√
PUgUEexj + nEe (2)
where nEe is the Gaussian noise (with variance σ2n) at the ED.
We are interested in quantifying the secrecy outage prob-
ability in the downlink. To this end, we require expressions
for the BS-UE and BS-ED channel capacities. Based on the
models described above, the capacity of the BS-UE channel
can be written as
CBU = log2(1 + γBU ) (3)
where
γBU =
PB max
k∈{1...K}
(
|hBkU |
2
dαBU
)
̟PU |gUU |2 + σ2n
(4)
and the max operation results from the TAS scheme at the
BS. For the BS-ED channel, the capacity is given by
CBE∗ = log2(1 + γBE∗) (5)
where
γBE∗ = F

 PB |hB∗Ee |
2
dαBEe
̟
PU |hUEe |
2
dαUEe
+ σ2n

 (6)
with
B∗ = arg max
k∈{1...K}
( |hBkU |2
dαBU
)
(7)
and F(·) is an operator that takes different forms depending
on whether EDs act independently or whether they collude. In
the former case, we have
F(·) = max
e∈Φ
(·) (8)
3This can be achieved by feeding back CSI from the UE to the BS
directly or through channel reciprocity in the case of time-division duplex
transmissions.
so that we ensure we consider the strongest ED channel,
whereas in the case of colluding eavesdroppers, the operator
is given by
F(·) =
∑
e∈Φ
(·) (9)
since all EDs are capable of combining their signals in
an optimal manner to decode the message. Based on these
formulae, the secrecy outage probability can be defined as [20]
Pso = P([CBU − CBE∗ ]+ < ǫ) ≃ P
(
γBU
γBE∗
< β
)
(10)
where [x]+ = max(0, x), P(·) denotes the probability opera-
tor, ǫ denotes the target secrecy rate, β = 2ǫ denotes the target
secrecy SNR ratio4.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY FOR
INDEPENDENTLY ACTING EAVESDROPPERS
Here, we analyse the secrecy outage probability of the
downlink for HD and FD UEs under the assumption that EDs
act independently of one another. The EDs cannot share their
received signals in this case, so secrecy outage is dictated by
the ED with highest channel capacity. Hence, F(·) is defined
by (8). We begin by considering an HD UE, then proceed with
a treatment of the problem for an FD UE.
A. Half Duplex UE
Beginning with the right-hand side of (10), the secrecy
outage probability can be evaluated to yield the result stated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: For large R, the downlink secrecy outage
probability for an HD UE is, to a good approximation, given
by
P (H)so ≃ 1−
K∑
k=1
(−1)k+1CkK
√
pq
2
p+2q−3
2 π
p+2q
2 −1
×Gp+2q,00,p+2q
(
a2qk b
p
pp4qq2q
∣∣∣∣ −0, 1p , ..., p−1p , 12q , 22q , ..., 1
)
(11)
where Gm,ns,t
(
z
∣∣∣∣ u1, . . . , usv1, . . . , vt
)
is the Meijer G function,
CkK = K!/((K − k)!k!) is the binomial coefficient, ak =
kdαBU , b = πρEΓ(1 + 2/α)β
2/α
, p, q ∈ Z+ so that α = p/q
is a positive rational number, and Γ(x) =
∫∞
0 t
x−1et dt is the
standard gamma function.
Proof: See Appendix I.
Eq. (11) provides an explicit, relation between the secrecy
outage probability and various system parameters. A number
of interesting points can be noted from this expression. First,
this is the most complete analysis of the HD UE case reported
in the literature in that any rational path loss exponent is
accounted for in this expression. Indeed, since the path loss
exponent is an experimentally estimated parameter, it is, by
4The approximation in (10) is a standard assumption for systems oper-
ating in the high SNR region. In this paper, this condition implies PB is
sufficiently large and/or R is sufficiently small.
4definition, rational in practice due to finite precision measure-
ment equipment. Although the outage probability is given in
terms of the Meijer G function, it can be easily evaluated
using numerical software such as Mathematica or Maple for
any given inputs. It should be noted that for the special case
of α = 2, (11) reduces to the following expression written in
terms of first order modified Bessel functions of the second
kind:
P (H)so ≃ 1− 2
K∑
k=1
(−1)k+1CkK
√
akbK1
(
2
√
akb
)
(12)
However, for other values of α, the expression given in the
proposition is the most compact, accessible form. Note that
the expression given in Proposition 1 is independent of R.
This is because the R-dependent terms in the secrecy outage
probability expression decay exponentially with Rα. (See
Appendix I for details.)
For fixed dBU , ρE , β, and α, the secrecy outage probability
solely depends on the available number of BS antennas K . It
is not a function of the transmit power PB . This is perfectly
intuitive since an increase in PB would yield a proportional
increase in both the UE SNR and the ED SNR. Thus, in order
to satisfy a given secrecy requirement, one must increase the
number of antennas used in the TAS procedure. With large-
scale antenna systems and massive MIMO making headlines
in the research community in recent years, it is prudent to ask
how the secrecy outage probability scales with the number
of antennas used for selection. Since the BS-ED channels
are not considered in the selection process, it is clear that
the secrecy outage probability decreased monotonically with
increasing K . But how fast does this occur? The following
lemma provides some insight to this question.
Lemma 2: The downlink secrecy outage probability for an
HD UE located in the presence of independently acting EDs
is lower bounded by
P (H)so >
πρEd
2
BUβ
2/αΓ(1 + 2/α)
e (lnK)2/α
(
1 +O
(
1
(lnK)2/α
))
(13)
as K →∞.
Proof: See Appendix II.
This result implies that, for large numbers of antennas,
secrecy performance improves slowly with increasing K .
From a system design perspective, this is a very important
result. It suggests that even systems with large numbers of
antennas (e.g., massive MIMO systems with a TAS-based
secrecy enhancement mode) should exploit only a small subset
of independent spatial paths to perform selection. Such an
approach would allow the remaining elements to serve other
UEs on separate channels. The total number of transmit chains
(i.e., up-conversion and power amplification circuitry) required
would be the number of UEs served in a single channel use.
The actual benefit brought by TAS in the context of enhancing
secrecy performance is explored further in Section V through
numerical simulations.
B. Full Duplex UE
In the case where FD jamming is employed by the UE, the
jamming signal will affect both the EDs and the UE. Thus,
a self-interference cancellation scheme must be applied at the
UE. Here, we assume the self-interference cancellation scheme
is not perfect, and thus residual interference will remain. Also,
we are interested in the worst-case secrecy performance. Thus,
in this section, we assume the EDs are interference limited
(from the UE’s jamming signal). Mathematically, we set σ2n =
0. A similar approach was taken in [21]–[23]. Now, beginning
with the right-hand side of (10), the secrecy outage probability
can be evaluated to yield the result stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3: The downlink secrecy outage probability for
an FD UE located in the presence of independently acting EDs
is upper bounded by
P (F )so ≤ 1− e−ρEπR
2
K∑
k=1
(−1)k+1kCkK
∫ ∞
0
PU
dαBU
(1 + λUU ) + kxλUU
( PUdαBU
+ kxλUU )2
exp
(
ρER
2Ψ
(
x
β
;α,
dBU
R
)
− kd
α
BU
PU
x
)
dx (14)
where
Ψ(y;α, δ) =
∫ 2π
0
∫ 1
0
yzα+1
yzα + (z2 + δ2 − 2zδ cos θ)α/2 dz dθ
(15)
and λUU = E[|gUU |2] is the average gain of the self-
interference channel at the FD UE.
Proof: See Appendix III.
The bound stated above can be evaluated for given sets of
parameters by using standard numerical integration techniques
or software. Note that the semi-infinite integral is guaranteed to
converge since Ψ(y;α, δ) is finite for y ∈ [0,∞). For the case
where α = 2, the bound simplifies somewhat since Ψ(y;α, δ)
evaluates to
Ψ(y; 2, δ) =
πy
(y + 1)3
(
(y + 1)(ψ(y, δ)− δ2)
+ δ2(y− 1) ln
(
2δ2y
δ2(y − 1) + (y + 1)(ψ(y, δ) + y + 1)
))
(16)
where
ψ(y, δ) =
√
δ4 + 2δ2(y − 1) + (y + 1)2. (17)
For fixed dBU , ρE , λUU , β, and α, the secrecy outage
probability depends on the available number of BS antennas
K , but also on the UE jamming signal power PU . This
provides two degrees of freedom that can be considered at
a system level when determining the best configuration for
achieving a target secrecy outage probability. For example,
the UE may locally determine that it should reduce PU to
conserve battery power, which implies the BS should increase
the number of antennas used for TAS. Further analysis of the
5trade-off between these parameters and the effect this has on
system performance are presented in Section V.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY FOR COLLUDING
EDS
Here, we analyse the secrecy outage probability in the
downlink for HD and FD UEs with the assumption that
EDs collude with each other. In contrast to independently
acting EDs, colluding EDs can share their eavesdropping
information; therefore, all the eavesdropping information can
be combined in an effort to decode the downlink message.
Under the assumption that optimal combining can be achieved
by the EDs, F(·) is defined by (9). We first consider an HD
UE, then a treatment of the problem for an FD UE will be
provided.
A. Half Duplex UE
By using the right-hand side of (10) the secrecy outage
probability can written exactly as in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: The downlink secrecy outage probability for
an HD UE located in the presence of colluding EDs is given
by
P (H)so = 1−
K∑
k=1
CkK(−1)k+1
× exp
(
−πR2ρEF
(
1,
2
α
; 1 +
2
α
;− R
α
kβdαBU
))
(18)
where F (a, b; c; z) denotes the Gaussian hypergeometric func-
tion.
Proof: See Appendix IV.
Eq. (18) provides an explicit, exact relation between the
secrecy outage probability and various system parameters. For
α = 2, this expression simplifies readily to
P (H)so = 1−
K∑
k=1
CkK(−1)k+1
(
1 +
R2
βd2BUk
)−πρEβd2BUk
.
(19)
For α = 4, (18) can be expressed as
P (H)so = 1−
K∑
k=1
CkK(−1)k+1
× exp
(
−πρERdBU
√
βk tan−1
(
R
dBU
√
βk
))
. (20)
Other values of the path loss exponent do admit closed form
expressions by eq. (18). To avoid the redundant discussion,
we have not mentioned another pathloss exponents here.
B. Full Duplex UE
When FD jamming is utilized by the UE, we assume self-
interference cancellation is employed by the UE and consider
the interference limited regime for EDs (i.e., σ2n = 0 at each
ED). Following from the right-hand side of (10), the secrecy
outage probability in this scenario can be evaluated to yield
the tight bound stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5: The downlink secrecy outage probability for
an FD UE located in the presence of colluding EDs is bounded
by
P (F )so ≤ 1 +
K∑
k=1
CkK(−1)k
×exp
(
−ρE
∫ R
0
∫ 2π
0
Ak(r, θ)e
Ak(r,θ)E1(Ak(r, θ)) r dθ dr
)
,
(21)
where E1(x) =
∫∞
x
e−t
t dt denotes the exponential integral and
Ak(r, θ) =
2kβ
PU
dαBU
(
r√
r2 + d2BU − 2rdBUcos(θ)
)−α
.
(22)
Proof: See Appendix V.
Eq. (21) can be evaluated for given sets of parameters by
using standard numerical integration techniques or software.
However, it is useful to have an approximation of this ex-
pression that does not require numerical integration. We give
such an approximation for α = 2 in the following lemma, and
we validate the approximation in the next section through an
extensive simulation study.
Lemma 6: For α = 2, the downlink secrecy outage proba-
bility for an FD UE located in the presence of colluding EDs
operating in the interference limited regime is approximated
by
P (F )so ≃ 1 +
K∑
k=1
CkK(−1)k exp
(
− ρE
(
π̺2
−πPU
2kβ
(
(̺/dBU )
2 − ln(1− (̺/dBU )2)
)
+Ω(β; dBU , R,A0)
))
(23)
where ̺ ∈ (0, R), A0 = 2kβd2BU/PU , and Ω(β; dBU , R,A0)
is given as (24) at the top of the next page.
Proof: See Appendix V.
V. SIMULATIONS RESULTS
In this section, simulation results (based on the left-hand
side of (10)) are given to verify the above analysis. In
the simulations, we assume the noise variance σ2n = 1,
the transmission-power-to-noise ratio PB/σ2n = 50 dB, and
the target secrecy SNR β = 1. The simulation results are
obtained by averaging over 105 independent Monte Carlo
trials. Moreover, the single-antenna scheme (K = 1) is our
benchmark and has been considered in this section.
Firstly, Table I gives an overview of how different system
parameters affect secrecy outage for the four cases discussed
in the previous sections, where IE and CE denote indepen-
dent and colluding eavesdropper case, respectively, ր, ց
and − denote increasing, decreasing and unchanging trends,
respectively. It is clear that the secrecy outage probability for
each of the four cases increases with increasing ED density,
target SNR β, and BS-UE distance dBU . On the contrary,
the secrecy outage probability decreases with the number of
transmission antennas K . With the increasing of α, the secrecy
6Ω(β; dBU , R,A0) =− A0π
̺4R4
(4R4̺4d2BU (A0 + 1/4)(ln(̺)
2 + 2 ln(A0dBU ) ln(R/̺)− ln(R)2)
+R4̺4 ln ̺ ((A0 + 1)̺
2 − 8(A0κ− (9/4)A20 + (1/4)κ+ 1/4)d2BU − d4BUA0/̺4)
−R4̺4 lnR ((A0 + 1)R2 − 8(A0κ− (9/4)A20 + (1/4)κ+ 1/4)d2BU − d4BUA0)
+ (R2 − ̺2)(̺2(R2(A0 + 1)̺2 + d4BUA0)R2 ln(A0) + ̺2(R2(A0 + 1)̺2 + d4BUA0)R2 ln(dBU )
+R4(−A20 + (κ+ 1)A0 + κ+ 3/2)̺4 +A0((κ− 9A0)R2 − (1/2)d2BUA0)d4BU̺2 − (1/2)R2d6BUA20)).
(24)
TABLE II
EFFECTS OF PARAMETERS INCREASES ON SECRECY OUTAGE
PROBABILITY. UPWARD (DOWNWARD) ARROWS SIGNIFY AN INCREASE
(DECREASE). HORIZONTAL DASHES DENOTE LITTLE TO NO CHANGE. AN
ARROW FOLLOWED BY A DASH SIGNIFIES CONVERGENCE TO A POSITIVE,
FINITE VALUE. ARROWS FOLLOWED BY PARENTHETICAL EXPRESSIONS
DENOTE THE TREND OF INCREASE/DECREASE (EITHER LOGARITHMIC OR
A POWER LAW).
HD IE FD IE HD CE FD CE
K ր ց (log) ց (log) ց (log) ց (log)
ρE ր ր ր ր ր
β ր ր ր ր ր
dBU ր ր ր ր ր
α ր ց − ր − ց − ր −
λUU ր − ր − ր
PU/σ
2
n ր − ց (power) − ց (power)
PB/σ
2
n ր − − − −
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Fig. 2. Theoretical (T.R.) vs simulated (S.R.) secrecy outage proba-
bilities for the HD UE in the presence of different densities of EDs,
where α = 4, dBU = 10 m and R = 100 m.
outage probability in the HD case decreases slowly while the
secrecy outage probability in the FD case increases steadily
until it converges to a finite value (more details in Fig. 7).
Note that the secrecy outage probability is independent of
the transmit power-to-noise ratio PB/σ2n for the BS. Finally,
the transmit power-to-noise ratio PU/σ2n for the UE and the
residual self-interference channel gain (λUU ) only affects the
FD case which is shown in Figs. 5 and 6, respectively.
Fig. 2 verifies the secrecy outage probabilities for the
HD UE for independent EDs (11) and colluding EDs (18),
respectively. Here we let dBU = 10 m, R = 100 m and
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Fig. 3. The comparison of secrecy outage probabilities for HD UEs
with different numbers of antennas (K), where ρE = 0.005 m−2,
α = 2 dBU = 5 m and R = 50 m.
α = 4. Both the simulated results (S.R.) and theoretical results
(T.R.) are presented, which are shown to perfectly match.
Furthermore, it is clear from these results that the secrecy
outage probability slowly decreases as the number of transmit
antennas increases for both cases, which has been predicted
by Lemma 2. The secrecy outage probability for independent
EDs is always smaller than that for the colluding case, because
of the shared eavesdropping information.
Fig. 3 compares secrecy outage probabilities for HD UEs
with different numbers of antennas (K), where ρE = 0.005
m−2, α = 2 dBU = 5 m and R = 50 m. It is clear to see
that when the number of antennas ranges from 1 to 15, there
exists a significant secrecy performance gain. However, with
increasing numbers of antennas after 15, secrecy performance
improves slowly with 1/ln(K), which has been confirmed
by Lemma 2. From a system design perspective, this is a
very important result. It suggests that even systems with large
numbers of antennas (e.g., massive MIMO systems with a
TAS-based secrecy enhancement mode) should exploit only a
small subset of independent spatial paths to perform selection.
The comparison between the T.R. and S.R. of secrecy outage
probabilities for the FD UE is shown in Fig. 4, where we
let λUU = 0 dB, dBU = 5 m, R = 50 m, ̺ = 15 and
α = 2. Again, the theoretical results generated with the help
of (14) for independent EDs and (21) for colluding EDs are
5According to the simulation results, accurate results were obtained for
̺ close to one.
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Fig. 4. T.R. vs S.R. and approximation results (A.R.) secrecy outage
probabilities for the FD UE in the presence of different densities of
EDs, where α = 2, dBU = 5 m, R = 50 m and ̺ = 1 for A.R.
well matched to the simulation results. And the approximation
results (A.R.) (23) for colluding EDs were confirmed by
simulation results as well. Moreover, it is clear that the
secrecy outage probability decreases exponentially quickly as
the density of EDs decreases, as predicted by Propositions 3
and 5.
Fig. 5 shows the comparison between the T.R. and S.R.
of secrecy outage probabilities versus different transmission
power-to-noise ratio for the FD UE in the presence of inde-
pendent and colluding EDs, where λUU = 0 dB, dBU = 5 m,
R = 50 m, ρE = 0.005 m
−2 and α = 2. For these system
parameters, the average number of EDs located in the vicinity
of the BS (i.e., the circle of radius R centered at the BS)
is approximately 39. Hence, these parameters provide a view
of performance in a fairly hostile environment. We can see
that the T.R. of independent (14) and colluding (21) EDs are
well matched to the S.R. Then it is clear that the secrecy
outage probability linearly decreases asymptotically on the
log-log scale as the transmission power-to-noise ratio at the
UE increases for both cases. Furthermore, when the required
secrecy outage probability is 0.05, if the number of antennas
increases from 1 to 5, almost 10 dB SNR can be saved for
both cases. The above figures verified the analysis in Section
III and IV. In order to maintain clarity of presentation, only
the simulation results are shown in the following figures.
According to [24], radio transmissions always encounter
a bandwidth constraint that limits maximum self-interference
cancellation. Therefore, it is useful to consider how residual
self-interference affects the secrecy outage performance of the
FD scheme. Fig. 6 compares the secrecy outage probabilities
of independent (Fig. 6(a)) and colluding (Fig. 6(b)) EDs for the
HD and FD modes with respect to different λUU and α, where
dBU = 10 m, R = 50 m, K = 5 and ρE = 0.001 m−2. Hence,
in this example, we consider a more secure environment with
an average of about eight EDs located in the vicinity of the
BS. It is clearly shown in the figures that as the residual self-
interference increases, the secrecy outage probability of the
FD case is adversely affected. Obviously, there is no self-
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Fig. 5. T.R. vs S.R. secrecy outage probabilities for the FD UE
with different transmission power-to-noise ratios at the UE, where
dBU = 5 m, R = 50 m and ρE = 0.005 m−2.
interference for the HD scheme; hence, the performance is
constant for all λUU in this figure. Of more interest is the
observation that the secrecy outage probabilities of the HD
mode are always less than for the FD mode when λUU is less
than about 11.5 dB and 10 dB for independent and colluding
cases, respectively, when PU/σ2U = 60 dB. Furthermore, an
important point shown in Fig. 6 is that when the path loss
exponent α increases, the enhancement of secrecy performance
by using the FD scheme will be limited due to the significant
attenuation of the jamming signal from the FD UE to the
EDs. Therefore, we should increase the jamming power PU
according to the theoretical expressions given in Propositions
3 and 5 so that the secrecy outage probability can be reduced.
This information can be employed in practice to switch
between HD and FD modes given the bandwidth constraints
of the system with different path loss exponents. Since the
available system bandwidth of modern communication links
can change based on channel quality and the prescribed quality
of service, this observation could be of great importance in
future cellular networks [24].
Fig. 7 shows the comparison of secrecy outage probabilities
versus different path loss exponents for the HD and FD UE
cases operating in the presence of independent and colluding
EDs, where λUU = 0 dB, dBU = 5 m, R = 50 m, ρE =
0.001 m−2 and K = 1 and 5. In this example, there are
on average about eight eavesdroppers in the vicinity of the
network. We can see that the secrecy outage probability for
HD UE with independent and colluding EDs slightly decreases
until reaching a flat tail with an increasing path loss exponent.
On the contrary, the secrecy outage probability for the FD
case increases to this saturation point. The reason is that when
the UE’s transmission power fixed, the power of the jamming
signal from the FD UE is attenuated significantly for large α.
Furthermore, it is clear that the secrecy outage probability for
colluding EDs is always higher than for independent EDs.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied a method of enhancing secrecy
performance in wireless networks with randomly located in-
dependent and colluding EDs, which relies on the use of TAS
at the base station and an FD jamming scheme at the UE.
For both of these models, we obtained expressions for the
secrecy outage probability in the downlink for HD and FD
UE operation. The expressions for HD systems have very
accurate approximate or exact forms in terms of elementary
and/or special functions for all path loss exponents. Those
related to the FD systems have very accurate approximate or
exact integral forms for general path loss exponents, while
exact closed forms are given for specific exponents. These
results have been confirmed by simulated simulations which
showed how secrecy performance can be enhanced by TAS and
FD communications. Our results provide useful insight and
analytical tools that can be used to develop adaptive system
solutions (examples were briefly discussed for hybrid HD/FD
UE operation) as well as a solid basis for further study.
APPENDIX I
We assume all channels are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.); consequently, the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) and probability density function (PDF) of γBU
in (4) with ̟ = 0 are given by
FγBU (x) =
(
1− e−xdαBU
)K
=
K∑
k=0
CkK(−1)ke−kxd
α
BU ,
fγBU (x) =
K∑
k=1
CkK(−1)k+1kdαBUe−kxd
α
BU ,
(25)
respectively, where CkK = K!/[k!(K − k)!] is the binomial
coefficient. Then, the CDF of γBE∗ in (6) with ̟ = 0 can be
calculated as
FγBE∗ (y) = P
(
max
e∈Φ
( |hB∗Ee |2
dαBEe
)
< y
)
(a)
= EΦ
[∏
e∈Φ
P
(|hB∗Ee |2 < ydαBEe | Φ)
]
= EΦ
[∏
e∈Φ
(
1− e−ydαBEe
)]
(b)
= exp
(
−ρE
∫ 2π
0
∫ R
0
r
(
e−yr
α
)
dr dθ
)
(c)
= exp
(
−2πρE
αy
2
α
(
Γ
(
2
α
)
− Γ
(
2
α
, yRα
)))
(d)
= exp
(
−2πρE
αy
2
α
Γ
(
2
α
))(
1 +
2πρE
αy
2
α
O(R2−αy2/α−1e−yR
α
)
)
,
(26)
9where Γ(·) and Γ(·, ·) denote the gamma and upper incomplete
gamma function, respectively, and where eq. (a) follows from
the independence of R.V.s {|hB∗Ee |2;Ee ∈ Φ}; eq. (b) holds
for the probability generating functional lemma [25]; eq. (c)
holds by using eq. (3.326.4) in [26]; eq. (d) follows from
the asymptotic expansion of the incomplete gamma function
(R→∞) [27].
According to the definition of secrecy outage probability in
(10), (25) and (26), we can obtain an approximation of the
secrecy outage probability as follows
P (H)so = 1−
∫ ∞
0
fγBU (x)FγBE∗
(
x
β
)
dx
= 1−
K∑
k=1
CkK(−1)k+1kdαBU
∫ ∞
0
e−kxd
α
BU e
−
2piρE
α( xβ )
2/α
Γ( 2α )
dx.
(27)
We let
I =
∫ ∞
0
e−axe−
b
xc dx =
∫ ∞
0
ue−aue
−
(
b1/c
x
)c du
u
(28)
where a = kdαBU , b =
2πρE
α Γ(
2q
p )β
2q/p and c = 2q/p. By
using the Mellin convolution theorem, we can get the Mellin
transform as
M[I; s] = p
2qas+1
Γ
(
ps
2q
)
Γ(1 + s). (29)
Then the inverse transform can be written as
I =
p
2πia
∫ u+i∞
u−i∞
Γ (ps) Γ
(
2q(s+
1
2q
)
)
(a2qbp)−s ds
(a)
=
√
pq
a2
p+2q−3
2 π
p+2q
2 −1
1
2πi
×
∫ u+i∞
u−i∞
(
a2qbp
pp4qq2q
)−s p−1∏
n=0
Γ
(
s+
n
p
) 2q−1∏
n=0
Γ
(
s+
1 + n
2q
)
ds
=
√
pq
a2
p+2q−3
2 π
p+2q
2 −1
×Gp+2q,00,p+2q
(
a2qk b
p
pp4qq2q
∣∣∣∣ −0, 1p , ..., p−1p , 12q , 22q , ..., 1
)
,
(30)
where G(·) denotes Meijer’s G furcation, u > 0 and (a) holds
from the multiplication theorem [27].
APPENDIX II
We begin with the following basic integral definition of the
secrecy outage probability for this case
P (H)so = b1c1
∫ ∞
0
(1− e−ax)K e
−b1/x
c1
x1+c1
dx (31)
where a = βdαBU , b1 = c1πρEΓ(2/α) and c1 = 2/α. This
expression can easily be derived from the definitions of the UE
SNR and the ED SNR and follows the calculations presented
in Appendix I. Since the integrand is nonnegative on the
interval [0,∞), we have the simple relations
P (H)so > b1c1
∫ ∞
lnK
a
(1− e−ax)K e
−b1/x
c1
x1+c1
dx
> b1c1
(
1− 1
K
)K ∫ ∞
lnK
a
e−b1/x
c1
x1+c1
dx
=
(
1− 1
K
)K (
1− exp
(
− a
c1b1
(lnK)c1
))
(32)
where the equality results from the substitution u = 1/xc1 .
Letting K grow large, the final line of the equation given
above becomes
e−1
(
1 +O
(
1
K
))(
1−
(
1− a
c1b1
(lnK)c1
+O
(
1
(lnK)2c1
)))
(33)
and the result stated in the lemma follows.
APPENDIX III
According to (10), (4) and (6) with ̟ = 1, we let
X1 = PU max
k∈(1...K)
(|hBkU |2) and X2 = |hUU |2. Then after
self-interference cancellation, the average channel gain of the
residual self-interference can be denoted as λUU . Therefore,
the CDF of X1 and the PDF of X2 can be written as
FX1 (x1) =
K∑
k=0
CkK(−1)ke−
kx1d
α
BU
PU
fX2(x2) = 1/λUUe
−x2/λUU ,
(34)
respectively. The CDF and PDF of X = X1X2+1 are given by
FX(x) =
∫ ∞
0
Fx1(x(x2 + 1))fx2(x2) dx2
=
K∑
k=0
CkK(−1)k
PU
dαBU
e
−
kxdαBU
PU
PU
dαBU
+ kxλUU
(35)
and
fX(x) =
K∑
k=1
CkK(−1)k+1
(PU + kxλUUd
α
BU + PUλUU )ke
−
kxdαBU
PU
dαBU (
PU
dαBU
+ kxλUU )2
.
(36)
Then letting Y = max
e∈Φ
(
|hB∗Ee |
2
dαBEe
/
|hUEe |
2
dαUEe
)
, it is possible to
show that the CDF of Y can be written as (37) in the top of
the next page, where
Ξ(y; r, θ) = 1− yr
α
yrα + (
√
r2 + d2BU − 2rdBUcosθ)α
, (38)
and (a) follows from the independence of |hB∗Ee |2|hUEe |2 ;Ee ∈ Φ,(b) holds since the CDF
Fν(ν) = P
( |hB∗Ee |2
|hUEe |2
< ν
)
=
ν
ν + dαUE/d
α
BE
, (39)
and (c) holds for the probability generating functional lemma
[25]. Then by using (36) and (37), the secrecy outage proba-
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FY (y) = P

max
e∈Φ

 |hB∗Ee |
2
dαBEe
|hUEe |
2
dαUEe

 < y

 = EΦ
[
P
(
max
e∈Φ
(
|hB∗Ee |2d−αBEe
|hUEe |2d−αUEe
)
< y | Φ
)]
(a)
= EΦ
[∏
e∈Φ
P
( |hB∗Ee |2
|hUEe |2
< y
dαBEe
dαUEe
| Φ
)]
(b)
= EΦ
[∏
e∈Φ
(
ydαBEe
ydαBEe + d
α
UEe
)]
(c)
= exp
(
−ρE
∫ R
0
∫ 2π
0
rΞ(y; r, θ) dθ dr
)
.
(37)
bility of the FD UE can be written as
P (F )so ≤ 1−
∫ ∞
0
fX(x)FY
(
x
β
)
dx, (40)
which has been shown in Proposition 3.
APPENDIX IV
According to the definition of secrecy outage probability
(10), (4) and (6) with ̟ = 0, we can obtain the secrecy
outage probability as followed
P (H)so = P


max
k∈(1...K)
(
|hBkU |
2
dαBU
)
∑
e∈Φ
(
|hB∗Ee |
2
dαBEe
) < β


= P
(
max
k∈(1...K)
( |hBkU |2
dαBU
)
< β
∑
e∈Φ
( |hB∗Ee |2
dαBEe
))
=
K∑
k=0
CkK(−1)k
∫ ∞
0
e−kβzd
α
BU fZ(z) dz
=
K∑
k=0
CkK(−1)kE
[
e−sZ
] |s=kβdαBU
(41)
where Z =
∑
e∈Φ
(
|hB∗Ee |
2
dαBEe
)
and E
[
e−sZ
] |s=kβdαBU is given
by
E
[
e−sZ
] |s=kβdα
BU
= E
[∏
e∈Φ
e−kβd
α
BU |hB∗Ee |
2d−αBEe
]
= EΦ
[∏
e∈Φ
E|hB∗Ee |
2
[
e−kβd
α
BU |hB∗Ee |
2d−αBEe
]]
(a)
= EΦ
[∏
e∈Φ
∫ ∞
0
e−kβd
α
BU td
−α
BEe e−t dt
]
= EΦ
[∏
e∈Φ
1
1 + kβ(dBU/dBEe)
α
]
(b)
= exp
(
−ρE
∫ 2π
0
∫ R
0
(
1− 1
1 + kβ(dBU/r)α
)
r dr dθ
)
= exp
(
−πR2ρEF
(
1,
2
α
; 1 +
2
α
;− R
α
kβdαBU
))
,
(42)
where, for brevity and ease of exposition, we let t = |hB∗Ee |2
in (a) and the PDF of t is e−t, F (a, b; c; z) denotes the Gaus-
sian hypergeometric function, and (b) holds for the probability
generating functional lemma [25].
APPENDIX V
According to the definition of secrecy outage probability
in (10), (4) and (6) with ̟ = 1, modeling the residual self-
interference as AWGN noise [28], [29] and ignoring the noise
at ED as in [21]–[23], we can obtain the secrecy outage
probability as follows
P (F )so ≤ P


PB
2 maxk∈(1...K)
(
|hBkU |
2
dαBU
)
∑
e∈Φ
(
PB
|hB∗Ee
|2
dα
BEe
PU
|hUEe
|2
dα
UEe
) < β


= P

 max
k∈(1...K)
( |hBkU |2
dαBU
)
<
2β
PU
∑
e∈Φ

 |hB∗Ee |
2
dαBEe
|hUEe |
2
dαUEe




= 1 +
K∑
k=1
CkK(−1)k
∫ ∞
0
e
− 2kβPU
zdαBUfZ(z)dz
= 1 +
K∑
k=1
CkK(−1)kE
[
e−sZ
] |s= 2kβPU dαBU ,
(43)
where Z =
∑
e∈Φ

 |hB∗Ee |2dαBEe
|hUEe
|2
dα
UEe

 and E [e−sZ] |s= 2kβPU dαBU can be
obtained as (44) at the top of the next page. For brevity and
ease of exposition, we let t = |hB∗Ee |
2
|hUEe |
2 in (a) and the PDF
of t is 1/(1 + t)2, A = 2kβPU d
α
BU
(
r√
r2+d2BU−2rdBU cos(θ)
)−α
,
A0 =
2kβ
PU
d2BU , Ω(β; dBU , R,A0) is given as (24) and (b)
holds for the probability generating functional lemma [25]. In
(c), the first double integral can be approximately obtained by
using asymptotic (divergent) series [30] and the second double
integral can be approximated by using the Taylor series [31],
and (d) holds when α = 2.
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E
[
e−sZ
] |s= 2kβPU dαBU = E

∏
e∈Φ
e
− 2kβPU
dαBU
td
−α
BEe
(
√
d2
BEe
+d2
BU
−2dBEe
dBU cos(θ))
−α


= EΦ

∏
e∈Φ
Et

e−
2kβ
PU
dαBU
td
−α
BEe
(
√
d2
BEe
+d2
BU
−2dBEe
dBU cos(θ))
−α




(a)
= EΦ

∏
e∈Φ
∫ ∞
0
e
− 2kβPU
dαBU t
(
dBEe√
d2
BEe
+d2
BU
−2dBEe
dBU cos(θ)
)−α
1
(1 + t)2
dt

 (b)= exp
(
−ρE
∫ R
0
∫ 2π
0
AeAE1 (A) r dθ dr
)
(c)≃ exp
(
−ρE
(∫ ̺
0
∫ 2π
0
(1− 1/A)r dr dθ +
∫ R
̺
∫ 2π
0
A(A + 1) (A− ln(A) − κ) r dr dθ
))
(d)
= exp

−ρE

π̺2 − πPU
2kβ

ln

 1
1−
(
̺
dBU
)2

+ ( ̺
dBU
)2+Ω(β; dBU , R,A0)




. (44)
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